We explore the determinants of debt and growth in debt at the individual and household level. The focus is on the influence of expectations of individuals and households regarding their future financial situation. Our theoretical model predicts a positive association between the quantity of debt and optimism. The empirical findings provide convincing support for our theoretical priors in that optimism impacts positively on both the quantity of debt and the growth in debt. Our results suggest that it is optimism per se that is important in influencing debt rather than the accuracy of individuals' predictions regarding their future financial situation.
I Introduction
The last decade has witnessed a consumer credit explosion on both sides of the Atlantic, accompanying the sustained economic boom. In the UK the amount of unsecured borrowing accumulated by individuals and households, as a proportion of GDP, has more than doubled since 1993 to 16 per cent. 1 At the end of the first quarter of 2003 the total amount of unsecured debt was nearly £160 billion, or more than £4,000 for every adult of working age. Consequently policymakers are particularly interested in understanding what factors drive the decision to acquire increasing amounts of debt and whether or not such indebtedness is sustainable.
There is also considerable concern from social welfare lobbyists about the associated increase in personal debt problems experienced by individuals and families. For example, the National Association of Citizens Advice Bureau in the UK, 2 whose members dealt with approximately one million personal debt enquiries during 2001, reported a 39% increase in the number of new contacts in this area over the previous 4 years. Furthermore, they have highlighted the dramatic increase in the availability of unsecured consumer credit in the UK, over the past 25 years. 3 Changes include the massive rise in the number of different credit cards available (1,300 in 2000) and the increase in the range of financial institutions offering unsecured loans. From being primarily the preserve of the major (high street) banks, consumers can now also obtain such loans from building societies, UK-and overseas-based finance companies and even supermarkets. In addition, the advent of telephone and Internet-banking, and the availability of credit at the point of purchase, has increased the accessibility of consumer credit and the speed with which loans can be obtained.
Amongst academic economists, research into the determinants of individual debt or household level debt is surprisingly scarce. 4 This is somewhat puzzling as, according to the National Association of Citizens Advice Bureau in the UK, the most commonly reported reasons for debt problems, including job loss and poverty, are all closely related to economics. One explanation for this is the lack of available data on debt, at the individual and household level, especially in the United Kingdom. In this paper we partially redress this imbalance in existing research, using recently available data.
The broad aim of this paper is to explore the determinants of debt and the growth in debt at the individual and household level. Our main focus concerns one particular influence on the decision to acquire increasing amounts of debt, namely the financial expectations of individuals and households. To be specific, our theoretical framework predicts a positive association between individuals who are optimistic about their future financial situation and the amount of debt they acquire. In our empirical analysis, using samples derived from the 1995 and 2000 waves of the
British Household Panel Survey, we find consistent statistical support for our main proposition.
The paper is set-out as follows: Section II reviews the limited amount of existing research in this area; Section III presents our theoretical framework; Section IV outlines our data and methodology; Section V presents our empirical findings, whilst conclusions and avenues for future research are presented in Section VI.
II Background

Debt
The economic psychology literature represents one area of the economics literature where there has been significant interest in the determinants of personal debt. Livingstone and Lunt (1992) , for example, analyse the determinants of the level of debt and debt repayments across individuals and find that attitudinal factors, such as whether individuals are pro or anti debt, are key determinants.
Similarly, Lea et al. (1993) analyse individual level survey data and find that debt is correlated with economic, social and psychological factors. To be specific, individuals classified as 'serious'
debtors, who are likely to be young, single parents with an above average number of children, are found to be characterised by low socio-economic class, low income and are less likely to be owner level. This is yet to be convincingly demonstrated and it is one of the issues we explore in our empirical analysis.
Financial Expectations
At the macroeconomic level, a number of studies have investigated the impact of consumer expectations upon either business cycle trends [see McNabb and Taylor (2002) ] or household consumption patterns [see Acemoglu and Scott (1994) for the UK and Carroll et al. (1994) for the US]. The findings suggest that expectations impact upon the life-cycle consumption activities of households. Surprisingly, empirical analysis into how expectations influence the consumption (and savings) decisions of individuals has, however, been somewhat scarce.
One reason for this may be the fact that scepticism about the use of information derived from subjective survey data still prevails in the economics literature [Dominitz and Manski (1997) ].
There are however a number of recent studies which exploit subjective information on income expectations such as Guiso et al. (1992 Guiso et al. ( , 1996 . Similarly, Donkers and Van Soest (1999) include subjective information such as time preference and risk aversion, available in a panel survey of Dutch households, to measure household preferences. Although they do not have access to information on financial expectations and they focus on one specific type of debt (mortgages), they conclude that psychological variables are useful in analysing household behaviour under uncertainty in a life-cycle context.
The importance of expectations in analysing the decision to save at the individual level has been explored in the economic psychology literature. For example, Vanden Abeele (1988) reports a significant relationship between optimism and short-term saving. Similarly, Lunt and Livingstone (1991) find that saving is related to optimism about personal economic circumstances as well as optimism regarding the economy as a whole.
In the related literature on the demand for consumer durables, expectations play an important role. Pickering (1981) argues that models of the demand for consumer durables should include the nature of the decision-making process within the household, as well as consumers' expectations of general and personal economic conditions. Winer (1984) argues that such models should be refined by jointly modelling expectations of personal financial conditions and those for the general economic outlook. Similarly, Van Raaij and Gianotten (1990) explore the role of expectations in consumer spending using individual level survey data. To be specific, the questions relate to individuals' evaluations and expectations regarding the general economic situation, including inflation and unemployment, as well as expectations about household finances. Such information is found to partially explain consumer credit. 5 In sum, these studies stress the importance of expectations but do not explicitly focus on debt. However, Van Raaij and Gianotten (1990) comment that 'optimistic consumers tend to … borrow more than pessimistic consumers.
Consumer credit and mortgages tend to increase when consumers are in an optimistic mood.' [Van Raaij and Gianotten (1990), p.271] . In the remaining sections of the paper, we rigorously explore the validity of this assertion, in the context of individual and household debt, from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective.
III Theoretical Underpinnings
Some insight into the relationship between debt and expectations can be discerned from the following stylised model. In order to analyse the effect of expectations of future income on the amount of debt borne by consumers, we first consider representative consumers living two periods t=1,2. We then extend to the case of three periods t=1,2,3 in order to allow for possible difficulties in debt repayment, which could lead to a further loan into the next period in order to pay-off the existing one and sustain consumption. 6 The time units could be viewed as the 'present' and the 'future' or, in the case of three periods, as 'young', 'middle' and 'old' age of consumer life respectively. Consumers can borrow or save freely between periods at the safe ongoing (and for simplicity constant) interest rate of r where 0 < r < 1. There is full information, which means that lenders can always fully and costlessly observe the circumstances of borrowers and enforce the specifications of any loan agreement. Consumers have a twice differentiable and strictly concave utility function ) U(C t where C t is consumption and price is normalised to 1.
The time preference factor is D where 0 < D < 1. We take D to be equal to the inverse of the safe interest rate, that is ( )
. Competitive risk neutral lenders seek to make zero expected profits from lending an amount L to the borrowers. The effective range for L will be specified below. First period income, 0 y 1 > , and third period income, 0 y 3 > , are both certain.
7 Second period income y 2 is uncertain in that there are two income states -a high state, y 2H, occurring with exogenous probability p and a low state, 0 < y 2L < y 2H, which occurs with probability 1-p where 0 < p < 1. The probability p represents the common belief of borrower and lender that future or mid-life financial circumstances will be favourable, due to, for example, good macroeconomic conditions. So p, y 2H and y 2L fully describe the distribution of income in the model.
Consider the two period horizon first and let us rule out, for the time being, any liquidity constraints, i.e. both high and low second period income borrowers are assumed to be able to repay the debt at the ongoing rate, y 2H > y 2L >RL = L/D where R =1+r =1/D is the safe interest factor.
This simplifying assumption is made in order to focus on the basic form of the relationship between beliefs, p, and the loan size, L. It will be relaxed in the three period model (and it will become clear that it does not cause a loss of generality). By backward induction, optimal consumption levels in each second period realised state are obtained directly from the consumer's budget constraints:
where the loan size L has been determined from the past. Back to the first period, consumers maximise lifetime expected utility:
subject to the budget constraint:
Strict concavity ensures interior solutions in consumption. The first order condition is:
The lender's zero expected profit condition (due to entry conditions in a perfectly competitive financial market) is trivially satisfied, L = DRL where DR=1. So the size of the loan supply is indeterminate, as in standard constant returns to scale problems (again, it will be clear this has no implications on the generality of the results). Comparative statics carried out at an interior optimal amount of L then give:
which is always positive by strict concavity of the utility function (which makes the denominator negative) and by decreasing marginal utility (which makes the numerator negative, given y 2H > y 2L ).
Therefore, a consumption smoothing argument appears to justify the observed positive correlation between 'optimistic' expectations and the optimally chosen size of debt. Moreover, the wider the spread between second period income realisations, the stronger this effect.
The above represents a liquidity problem free environment. However, suppose that in the low income state consumer loans could not be feasibly repaid. That is, there exists some lower bound to L such that y 2L < RL. This might be because it is costly for the lender to set up the loan below this level or by sheer adversity (a value of y 2L close to zero: for example, a basic form of income support). Since we are considering unsecured lending, we will assume (again, as it turns out, with no loss of generality) that borrowers are protected by limited liability. That is, in case of default, the lender cannot seize y 2L , as would be the case with secured lending.
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The following analysis extends the model to a third period. Faced with a borrower unable to repay in the second period, the lender might be prepared to accept some immediate partial repayment of the existing loan plus interest (if this was zero the loan would just be written off). The lender would allow the borrower to do so (as well as sustain his/her second period consumption) by lending to him/her again into the third period, at a new interest rate, so long as the lifetime expected resources of the borrower allow the lender to at least break even on the deal. In other words, suppose that second period income is low and that the borrower makes a repayment of gRL. For the moment, take 0 < g < 1 to be an exogenous parameter: for example, a minimum repayment requirement such as 5% of the existing amount, as in some credit card and unsecured personal loan agreements. Then the lender may agree to take this payment and grant a new loan, L', to be repaid at a 'new' rate of interest, r', out of the borrower's third period income, y 3 . In the third period, the remaining part of the existing loan, (1-g)RL, would also have to be repaid at the new rate r'. As mentioned above, to keep matters tractable we take y 3 to be certain. Moreover, replicating our earlier two period framework, we also assume that there are no anticipated liquidity problems in the third period, i.e. 
followed by:
in the third period, if the lender agrees to the new loan, L'. By simple market logic, this will only happen if the lender is no worse off in so doing, than investing in the safe capital market at the ongoing rate r. That is, iff the overall return he/she gets from accepting a partial payment gL and granting a new loan L' at the new rate r' is at least as large as the return he/she would get from writing off L altogether and investing it at r instead. Evaluated at period 2 this gives the condition:
This reduces to:
i.e. Typically the payment factor g could include early payment penalties in the case of most uncompetitive lenders or could even 'knock down' some of the interest due on the existing agreement. Given R'= 1/D = R, optimal choice of L' in period 2 leads to consumption smoothing:
and to the optimal amount of L' (as a function of L given from the past):
Under the current setting, the lender would always consider such a deal, since his/her alternative is to receive zero from the borrower. This is because, on the one hand, y 2L <RL and, on the other hand, limited borrower liability prevents the lender from seizing y 2L . If the borrower had unlimited liability, the lender would seize y 2L and charge high income borrowers an interest rate ρ > R that would include a default premium and is set to satisfy the lender's zero expected profit condition in period 1.
This becomes clear below, once we examine the high income borrower's choice. Suppose he/she has enough liquidity to repay the existing loan at an interest factor, ρ. Then second period consumption in the high state would be y 2H -ρL. Due to full information the lender can costlessly observe all incomes. Thus, implicitly, a high income borrower is prevented from cheating -by pretending to be a low income type -because the lender can enforce the original agreement L. Third period consumption would simply be y 3 . But the high income borrower can still feasibly smooth out consumption between the second period and the third period at the safe factor R. So the correct expressions for consumption are:
Optimal choice of L' then leads to:
and:
Back to the first period, the borrower's lifetime expected utility is:
This time, the lender's zero expected profit condition is:
which reduces again to
for any size of L,L'. As mentioned, under unlimited liability, we would have obtained 2L . In other words, ρ would include a default premium, that allows the lender to recover its monies whilst letting borrowers default. However, the lender's problem would no longer be akin to a constant returns to scale case, since ρ would depend on the size of L. In fact, in equilibrium the lender would determine ρ on the basis of the above equation and the actual size of the optimal loan demand L by borrowers.
Substitution of ρ = R into the borrower's expected lifetime utility gives:
The first order condition in L is then:
the interior solution to which gives the consumer's demand for loans as a function of all the model's parameters, which forms the basis of our empirical investigation.
Comparative statics carried out at such an optimal amount of L then give:
which is again positive because of concavity and decreasing marginal utility. Hence our result of a positive relationship between optimal loan size and 'optimistic' expectations carries through to the more general three period scenario where consumers can have difficulties repaying their loan. In fact, what appears to be operating here is a moral hazard argument. Given the market conditions available in case of repayment difficulties (a payment of gRL and a further loan L' at rate R'=R), consumers want to take on a lot of debt. Higher expectations of high income, p, allow them to do so.
Specifying a model that includes asymmetric information is beyond the scope of this section, which aims to give a stylised representation of facts that forms the basis of our empirical investigation into the relationship between optimistic expectations and debt. Moreover, in the case of personal unsecured debt it is unlikely that lenders have anything less than full information, given the credit scoring system on which such lending is always based. However, there exists a large literature on loan contracts in the face of asymmetric information [e.g. Townsend (1979) , Gale and Hellwig (1985) , Mookherjee and Png (1989), Jost (1996) and Krasa and Villamil (2000)]. Lenders and borrowers have a common distribution and beliefs over future income, but whilst borrowers have full information, lenders cannot observe income realisations unless they pay some positive, usually fixed observation cost. The optimal loan contract generally involves random monitoring by lenders as well as a sequential rationality constraint imposed on the contract. This makes the lenders indifferent to monitoring, thus solving a commitment problem, while imposing on borrowers sufficient punishment to deter them from cheating. Such contracts also tend to be renegotiation proof. Essentially, this approach would mean including in our equilibrium loan model the appropriate incentive constraints. We predict that in such a general case the direction of the changes originating from a larger probability of high income would be the same.
IV Data and Methodology
In the remainder of this paper, we explore the empirical determinants of the amount of debt at both the individual and household level in Great Britain focusing upon the role of financial expectations. 14 The answers thus provide information on the amount of outstanding debt. There is also further information on the type of debt (e.g. hire purchase, personal loan and credit card) although the specific amount for each type is not given. It is surprising to note that there is a distinct lack of alternative datasets for Great Britain, which contain information related to the amount of debt at the individual and household level. The Family Resources Survey, for example, contains information on mortgage repayments only whilst the Family Expenditure Survey contains information on personal loans only. The defining feature of the BHPS, for the purpose of our study, is that it contains information on the total amount of debt, at the individual and household level, as well as individuals' expectations about their future financial situation. It is important, however, to acknowledge that there are some problems with the information provided in the BHPS. For example, there is no information on the time period over which the debt was accumulated -we simply have a measure of the extent of indebtedness at a point in time. 15 This issue is explored in greater depth later on.
Our sample includes the employed and self-employed aged between sixteen and sixty-five.
We exclude the unemployed thereby concentrating on a more homogenous group. One would predict, for example, that credit rationing is relatively more stringent for the unemployed. Answers to this question implicitly incorporate a synthesis of an individuals' own financial outlook (e.g. pay and job security) with their expectations about the general economic environment (e.g. future interest rates, tax changes, inflation and unemployment rates). Individuals who answer '1' are coded as 'optimistic' whilst those who answer '2' are coded as 'pessimistic'. 'Other' responses form the reference category in the empirical analysis. Hence, our aim is to explore how such financial expectations impact upon the amount of debt acquired.
Random Effects Approach
We initially explore the data for 1995 and 2000 separately. In order to investigate the extent to which the accumulation of debt is determined at the household level, we adopt a random effects approach whereby the panel dimension pertains to multiple observations of individuals within households. There is some variation in sample size across 1995 and 2000 . In 1995 (2000 , 1,656
(1,953) households are included in our study. The mean number of observations within the household in 1995 (2000) We initially explore the determinants of the logarithm of the amount of outstanding debt.
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Since we do not know over what time period the debt was accumulated, here we do not weight debt by income or wealth. By definition debt cannot be negative and so it is a censored variable. Hence, our approach to estimating the determinants of debt is to implement a random effects Tobit model to allow for the fact that a number of individuals report zero debt, following Bertaut and StarrMcCluer (2002) . 17 Hence, we estimate the following: where ρ represents the proportion of the total unexplained variance in the dependant variable contributed by the panel level variance component. Thus, the magnitude of ρ yields information pertaining to the importance of the household effect, i.e. a low ρ implies little unobservable intrahousehold correlation in the determinants of debt suggesting a small household effect. We compute random effects tobit estimates for each year separately.
We also specify a random effects probit estimator in order to explore how optimism and pessimism impact upon the probability of having a particular type of debt, such as a personal loan, hire purchase, credit card and other debt.
Cross-Section Analysis
In order to explore the robustness of the results derived from the random effects approach, we also explore the determinants of household level debt based on the sum of individuals' reported amount of debt within each household, where each unit of observation relates to the head of household.
Thus, the sample is heads of households only and the dependant variable equals household debt: 
<<FIGURES 3 TO 4 HERE>>
Although the focus of our paper lies in the role of financial expectations, we include a number of controls in our econometric analysis for personal and demographic characteristics in the vectors hi X and i X (Equations 21 and 25, respectively). These additional explanatory variables primarily relate to the individual's financial situation and include log annual income, a one year lag of log annual income, log spouse's gross pay, the total outstanding mortgage as a proportion of income, controls for taking on an additional mortgage, log savings plus investments and a dummy variable controlling for the receipt of a windfall. We also control for whether the individual has purchased any consumer durables in the last year and if any of the debt is a joint responsibility.
Finally, a set of dummy variables relating to how comfortable individuals are with their current financial situation is included in the analysis.
Demographic characteristics included are indicators for age, age squared, gender, ethnicity, highest educational qualification, married/cohabiting, the number of kids (aged less than 18), owner occupier with no mortgage, region of residence, household size and car ownership.
Explanatory variables were also incorporated to control for employment status, including a dummy variable for if unemployed in the previous wave, whether an individual has a second job or a permanent contract, whether the individual thinks there are any promotion opportunities in their job and controls for firm-size. An index of perceived job security, with zero being the lowest value and 6 representing the most secure, was also included.
Finally, we also control for the month of interview as debt may have a seasonal component. 
<<TABLE 1 HERE>>
Growth in Debt
In order to gain an understanding of the determinants of debt accumulation over time we now explore the growth in debt between 1995 and 2000. Ideally, in the econometric analysis described above we would weight debt by income or wealth so as to gain some idea about the degree of debt an individual or household holds in relation to other assets. However, because of the nature of the debt question we do not know the time period over which debt has been accumulated, i.e. the debt may have been acquired in the last year or over a longer period of time (a stock 
It is not possible to use a simple difference of income on the denominator of Equation 26
since we only know the growth in debt. Consequently, we estimate a log growth in debt model weighted by income over the period 1995 to 2000 based upon Equation 26 by random effects. Figure 5 shows how the dependent variable is distributed, where again we focus upon a logarithmic measure following Gropp et al. (1997) .
<<FIGURE 5 HERE>>
V Results
In this section, we initially discuss the determination of the amount of debt, followed by the growth in debt, and we focus attention on whether financial expectations have a role to play. Tables 2 and 3 present the results relating to the determinants of the amount of debt based upon either Equations 21 or 25, appertaining to random effects and standard Tobit estimations respectively. In Table 4 , we investigate the determinants of the probability of having different types of debt. We also explore the impact of financial expectations upon the growth in debt over the period 1995 to 2000, (Tables 6 to   7 ) based upon Equation 26. In both the amount of debt and growth in debt specifications, we focus upon individuals and their debt and also heads of households with equivalent household debt. In the case of the former, estimation by random effects allows us to gain an insight into the importance of household effects in influencing debt. In the following discussion, the key coefficients of interest are shown in bold in Tables 2 to 4 and 6 to 7. For brevity, only the coefficients of interest are reported in Tables 3 to 4 and 6 to 7.
The Amount of Debt at the Individual Level: Random Effects Analysis
The results presented in Table 2 , below, relate to the impact of expectations in the current year of interview upon the log amount of debt. 19 The first two columns of Table 2 show estimates based upon the random effects Tobit estimator for 1995 and 2000.
In both years, factors which had a significant and negative impact upon the amount of an individual's debt included if an individual was married and whether their home was owned outright.
This finding is contrary to that reported by Gropp et al. (1997) This is also supported by the estimated coefficient on an index of individuals' household size, which is insignificant in both 1995 and 2000. 21 Both of these findings suggest that debt is largely determined at the individual level, rather than acquired as a result of household level decisions.
The Amount of Debt at the Household Level: Cross Section Analysis
The final two columns of Table 2 relate to the determinants of debt at the household level based upon Equation 25. Essentially, the model is the same except that we are now estimating a standard cross sectional Tobit model for each year. Moreover, debt is defined as household debt and income is household income current and lagged (rather than variables defined at the individual level). 22 The results tell a similar story to those based upon individual level debt, in that there is evidence that male heads of households have lower debt (in 1995), as do married heads of households (in 2000).
Outright home ownership has a negative and significant impact upon debt in both years. Positive impacts upon household debt again come from similar sources as to those found when focusing upon individual debt, although it is noticeable that household income is only significant in the current year rather than for the lagged values. Turning to the optimism of heads of households, the results support our earlier findings with a positive and significant coefficient in both 1995 and 2000.
Again the effect of pessimism is insignificant. Furthermore, household size is important in determining the amount of household debt in accordance with the findings of Crook (2001) and Gropp et al. (1997) for the U.S.
The evidence presented in Table 2 is in accordance with our theoretical priors, in that optimism has a positive impact upon debt (both at the individual and household level). We now subject our empirical analysis to a number of robustness checks, with the results shown in Table 3 .
Robustness Checks
One could argue that the causality flow between optimism and debt is unclear. For example, an individual (household) who has taken on debt may be more optimistic about their financial future simply because they are now better off. So any significant correlation between debt and optimism might be because debt has a causal impact upon positive financial expectations rather than the other way around. To attempt to control for this, and to gain an insight into the causal link between debt and expectations, we replace current expectations with their lagged indicator (see Table 3 Panel A).
So, for example, lagged optimism denoted by Optimism t-1 in 1995 (period t) would be based upon the 1994 (period t-1) optimism value.
<<TABLE 3 HERE>> Table 3 adopts the same format as Table 2 with the first two columns reporting the results of individual level debt for 1995 and 2000, and the final two columns corresponding to household level debt. The control variables used are the same as in Table 2 and are omitted for brevity.
Focusing upon the 1995 results for individual and household level debt we find that lagged optimism is positive and significant. Interesting, lagged pessimism has a negative and significant influence upon debt. In 2000, the lagged optimism dummy is again significant for both individual and household debt, whereas pessimism has changed sign and is now insignificant. These results imply that the causal flow runs from financial expectations to debt rather than the other way around, and expectations operate through optimism rather than pessimism supporting our earlier results.
In Table 3 Panel B, we introduce both current and lagged expectations to see if financial expectations influence debt formation in a dynamic manner and once again report selected results.
The clear result across each year and specification is that expectations have an impact upon debt operating through current period optimism. Lagged optimism is only significant in the 2000 results and, interestingly, outweighs current optimism, whereas lagged pessimism is only significant in 1995 where it has a negative coefficient as found above.
So far in our analysis, we have not explored the type of debt undertaken. In Table 4 we present the results from exploring the effect of optimism and pessimism on the probability of holding particular types of debt. The types of debt are hire purchase, personal loan, credit card, and other types of loan. 23 Although, we can identify the type of loan unfortunately we do not know the amount within each category. In accordance with Tables 2 and 3 we present individual and household level results. It is apparent from Table 4 that with the exception of hire purchase at the household level in 1995 that optimistic financial expectations impacts positively on the probability of holding each type of debt.
<<TABLE 4 HERE>>
To summarise, throughout the results discussed so far, household effects have been shown to be small, given by the magnitude of ρ, suggesting that debt is an individual level choice rather than a household decision. There appears to be a clear role for financial expectations operating primarily through optimism and this finding is particularly robust. Finally, our findings suggest that the causal flow is from expectations to debt due to the significant positive relationship that exists between lagged optimism and debt.
Growth in Debt and Financial Expectations
Turning to the growth in debt between 1995 and 2000 as specified by Equation 26, we construct two measures of financial expectations. Initially expectations are defined by the total number of times an individual has been optimistic or pessimistic, hence over the period 1995 to 2000 both variables range from 0 to 6. The distribution of expectations over the period are presented below in Table 6 , column 1, we present selected results on the growth of individual debt, estimated by random effects, which show how the indices of optimism and pessimism, as described above, impact upon the growth in debt. An array of controls are entered into the regressions and are stated in Table 6 , but again the full results are omitted for brevity. As with the previous results, optimism has a positive and significant effect upon growth in debt and household effects (given by ρ) are small. This suggests that the more times an individual is optimistic over the period then the greater the growth in debt.
<<TABLE 6 HERE>>
In Table 6 column 2, we now consider the growth in household debt over the period and whether there is a role for household financial expectations in influencing debt. The dependent variable is now household debt weighted by household income over the period, and is distributed as shown in Figure 6 (defined by summing individuals' income within the household). Expectations are now a summation of individuals' expectations within the household, weighted by household size, and Equation 26 is estimated by OLS with robust standard errors.
<<FIGURE 6 HERE>>
It is noticeable that the number of times individuals within a household are optimistic has a positive and significant impact upon household debt, concurring with the results of the growth in individual level debt.
Growth in Debt, Financial Expectations and Forecasting Success
A natural question to ask at this point is does it matter whether the financial expectations formulated by an individual are correct? To ascertain forecasting success, we compare the prediction, i.e.
expectations at t, with the answer to the following question at t+1:
Would you say that you yourself are better off or worse off financially than you were a year ago?
Better off……………………………..1 Worse off.…………………………….2 About the same.………………………3 Don't know….………………………..4
From our information about financial expectations, and the responses to the above question, we are able to formulate indices about the number of correct predictions, which can range from 0 through to 6 (always correct). The distribution of correct financial expectations are shown above, in the final two columns of Table 5 Table 7 , with the controls as given in Table 6 . Neither the optimism nor the pessimism indices are significant, at the individual or household level, implying that forecasting success has no impact upon growth in debt.
In other words, it is having an optimistic financial outlook that leads to the accumulation of debt rather than whether such expectations are realised.
<<TABLE 7 HERE>>
VI Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have explored an issue, which is extremely topical amongst both economists and policy makers -namely the determinants of the amount of debt and the growth of debt at the individual and household level. Our main concern has been with the role of financial expectations in this context. To be specific, our theoretical framework predicts a positive association between optimism on the part of an individual and the amount of debt taken on. We have explored the empirical determinants of debt and growth in debt at the individual and household level, using data indicate that debt is determined at the individual rather than the household level. This is an important finding as much of the economics research into debt has been undertaken at the household level. Such an approach has not generally been justified in the existing literature and, our evidence suggests, that it may be inappropriate, at least in the UK context.
The findings that optimists incur approximately twice as much debt, than other individuals, and that their financial expectations are rarely realised may contribute to the understanding of why so many people encounter debt problems. Government policy could usefully be directed at identifying ways of curbing such unrealistic financial optimism, or constraining the amount of credit available to be more closely related to current income. However, careful targeting of such policies is necessary if adverse impacts on consumer expenditure and macroeconomic demand are to be avoided. In addition, further research into the formulation of financial expectations, and their influence on financial decision-making at the individual and household levels, is warranted. Note: We also include all the other explanatory variables as in Table 2 . *, # denote 5 and 10 per cent level of significance. 
